This is a liberal quotation from section on Earl Weaver in Bill James Book on baseball managers. I think it does a nice job of summing up why he was so good at what he did. When you read it, think about whether any Oriole managers in recent years were so thoughtful about what they were doing. Also, remember that during his first run with the Orioles, this guy never finished a full season with less than 80 wins and during that stretch his second-worst season was 88 wins – that’s one more win than the Why Not? ‘89 Orioles and the same record as the 1996 Orioles, two of the three best teams most people in the Camden Chat community remember. That’s just remarkable, in my opinion, especially when you think about the turnover his teams had.

Did He Favor a Set Lineup or a Rotation System? His first team, the 1969-1971 Orioles, had essentially a settled lineup. IN later hears he used a bewildering rotation system which involved not only platooning at four or more positions, but also three-man and four-man platoons, offensive and defensive specialists, and curveball/fastball platoons.

Did he Try to Solve His Problems with Proven Players or with Youngsters who Still may Have Had Something to Learn? What he liked to do was take two or three veteran minor leaguers, each of whom was one tool or two tools short of a whole package, and try to find some way to use them that would hide their weaknesses and make maximum use of what they did well. He had great success with guys like Pat Kelly, Larry Harlow, Andes Mora, Terry Crowley, John Lowenstein, and Benny Ayala, who for the most part would have never gotten more than a cup of coffee with other teams.
He also did a good job developing some young players, and he did look several years down the road, but only when he had a player with ability. He brought along Bobby Grich, Doug DeCinces, Don Baylor, and Eddie Murray. In 1982 he was the only man in the world who thought that Cal Ripken could be a major league shortstop.

Did He Pefer to Go with Good Offensive Players or Did He Like the Glove Men? Most of his players were clearly one or the other. There were many defensive specialists who played regularly for him, including Dempsey, Belanger, Larry Harlow, Etchebarren, Hendricks, Dauer, Paul Blair, and the aging Brooks Robinson. His teams always played outstanding defense. He also found room for some players who were slow and didn’t play great defense including Boog Powell, Ken Singleton, and a boatload of pinching-hitting outfielders.
What Weaver never used were the guys who didn’t do anything specific, but looked good in the uniform, the .260 hitters with 10 to 15 homers, a little speed, and so-so defense. (Acquiring these kinds of players seems to have be the guiding philosophy of the Baltimore Orioles for much of the past 12 years)

Did He Use the Entire Roster or Did He keep People Sitting on the Bench? He used everybody. Probably more than any other manager in history, Weaver had carefully defined roles for every player on his roster – not because he cared about the players (that’s for sure), but because he cared about the games. It was important to Weaver to have a player matched up in his mind with every possible game situation. If I’m down two runs in the eighth inning and the other guy switches from a left-handed starter to a right-handed reliever and back to a left-hander, will I have a pinch hitter to hit for my second baseman? If the pinch hitter hits a three-run homer, will I have someone who can go in at second base?
To Weaver, it was all but impossible to get every situation covered with just 25 men on the roster. It wasn’t a question of having 25 players and only 18 of them playing; if he had 30 men, he’d have started pinch-hitting in the fourth inning, and he’d used all 30.

Did He Go for the Big-Inning Offense, or Did He Like to Use One-Run Strategies? He is the most outspoken advocate of the big inning in baseball history.

Did He Pinch Hit Much, and If So, When? There is a considerable difference between what left fielders hit and first basemen hit, and what middle infielders hit. This difference is such that players who might not hit enough to be major league left fielders or first basemen, particularly if their defense is poor, will still hit more than some middle infielders.
Weaver exploited that differential by putting three or even four defensive specialists in the lineup, then pinch hitting for them with outfielders who were considered rejects by other teams. Of course, managers have done this for a hundred years, but Weaver did more of it than any other manager in his time, maybe more than any other manager of all time. Many managers simply put their eight best hitters in the field, or structure their roster in such a way that they have few opportunities to pinch-hit for the frontline players.
When the designated hitter rule was adopted in 1973, and Weaver no longer had to pinch-hit for his pitchers, he realized immediately that this in effect had expanded his roster, giving him more maneuverability with the bench. With the passage of time, the effect of the DH rule has been to allow managers to carry more pitchers, thus making more pitching changes. Weaver didn’t do that. Weaver used nine pitchers, which meant that he had room for eight starters and eight bench players, one of whom would be the DH. He needed to have two catchers, and he liked to have a third catcher who could actually hit. He needed a defensive backup for the outfield and a defensive backup for the infield. That left room for four extra outfielders an first basemen, all of whom could reach the seats. He used them to pinch-hit for guys, like Mark Belanger, Rick Dempsey, Rich Dauer, and Larry Harlow, whose job it was to catch everything and keep the starting pitcher in the game for the first seven innings.

Did He Use the Sac Bunt Often? He hated the bunt. In his early years he bunted 60 to 85 times a season, normal totals. As he got more settled into the job he began to bunt less and less. By the end of his career he was down to about 30 bunts a season.

Did He Like To Use the Running Game? He did not.

In What Circumstances Would He Issue an Intentional Walk? Whenever there was a blizzard in hell.

Did he Hit and Run Very Often? He did not.

How Did He Change the Game? Weaver was an outspoken advocate of the big inning, and an outspoken opponent of the bunt. His willingness to challenge orthodoxy on this subject combined with his success, helped push the sacrifice bunt towards extinction.
Weaver was somewhat out of step with baseball of the 1970’s, which featured new stolen base records every year, but might be considered one of the architects of the baseball of the 1990’s, which involves a lot of crowding the plate and trying to line the outside pitch into the opposite-field seats

Did He Like Power pitchers, or Did He Prefer to Go with the People Who Put the Ball In Play? He liked veteran pitchers who threw strikes. None of his teams ever led the league in strikeouts or walks allowed. Four of his teams led the league in fewest walks allowed.

Did he Stay With His Starters or Go To the Bullpen Quickly? He stayed with his starters. In 1979, for example, he used only 167 relievers in 159 games, the fewest of any team in baseball. The other American League teams averaged 219.

Did he used the Entire Staff, or did he Try to Get Five or Six People to Do Most of the Work? He always had a small staff and tried to get as many innings as he reasonably could out of his front four.

Was There Anything Unique About His Handling of His Pitchers? The most amazing thing about Earl Weaver’s record is his phenomenal ability to keep his starting pitchers healthy, while pitching them 260 innings a year.
His defense was outstanding; that reduced the pressure on his starting pitchers. Weaver believed in simplifying the work. He didn’t want pitchers out there trying to throw five or six pitches; he wanted to help them find their best stuff and use it.
He was religious about not pushing his pitchers to do too much early in the season. For many years the Baltimore Orioles were well stocked with pitchers who had good fastballs and absolutely refused to throw them to you. Weaver was able to get 270 innings a year out of Mike Cuellar , when all of his previous managers found that he would break down after 180.

What Were His Strongest Points As a Manager? Intelligence, intensity, patience. Understanding how an offense works.
Weaver managed within himself. Weaver believed if you understood and you respected the limitations of [an] athlete, then you could focus on the things that [he] could do.
Managers spend a lot of time talking about what a player can’t do, Weaver wasn’t interested in what a player couldn’t do. He was interested in what the player could do. If he can’t hit a breaking pitch, you don’t play him against Bert Blyleven. If he can’t run, you pinch-run for him – but you don’t let that stop you from developing what the player can do. It’s the things that players can do that will win games for you.

That the manager just doesn’t matter that much.

They would’ve been the Wild Card team in 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1980 and won the AL East in 1968 and 1982.

The 1981 strike season used a weird playoff format based on how teams finished in the part of the season before the strike and after the strike. Four teams went to the playoffs that year and although the Orioles weren’t one of then, they still finished with the third-best overall record in the American League.

there is really just nobody even close to Weaver managing the game anymore. And there never will be…

These two laws should be put on a sign above the entrance to the home dugout:

Weaver’s Fourth Law: Your most precious possessions on offense are your twenty-seven outs

Weaver’s Fifth Law: If you play for one run, that’s all you’ll get

Another good law: championships are won in the off-season.